i’ve been meaning to say something about this whole pdb mini-fiasco for a while, but i don’t want to wrap myself into a full essay, so hopefully i can keep this short…
after fighting the creation of a 9/11 investigative commission…
and fighting against giving that commission subpoena powers…
and in-effect declaring that the “independent, bipartisan commission” is a congressional commission (the separation-of-powers argument keeping dr. rice away from the microphones)….
and putting dr. rice on the media circuit to spin the story…
and limiting access to many documents under the color of classified material (and how did we manage to get people we couldn’t trust with classified material on this commission in the first place?)
and claiming privilege with regard to the presidential daily briefing…
and now spinning the rice testimony and the newly-declassified pdb….
now i get to say something about all this trouble from the bush administration… and speculate a bit. this administration hasn’t been forthcoming, so they’ve left lots of room for speculation.
everyone, up and down the intelligence hierarchy, signed off on this pdb. people in field offices made reports and their superiors passed them up to regional offices, and those got passed up to national offices, and through multiple agencies and through the cabinet-level officials, everyone decided that despite the inability to “corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting,” that this material was important enough for the desk of the president.
now, i may have unreasonable expectations here, but if i saw this document as president the first questions i’d ask are “what do we know about these al quaida members in the united states and this support structure they’ve created?” “what’s the status of these 70 investigations?” “is there anything else we should be doing?” (like, maybe, watching these al qaida members for strange things like… interstate travel or odd financial transactions?).
my people, operating in the most expensive and expansive intelligence-gathering structure in the history of the world used up 30 of less than 500 words in this brief to tell me there was an infrastructure inside the united states operating with the intent to “strike.”
that’s “actionable” enough for me. impossible to know if these actions might prevent or mitigate the 9/11 attacks, but i have more than a month to get upset about “terrorist support structures in the united states.”
it seems that almihdhar and alhazmi were identified as al qaida operatives by the cia in 1999 or 2000 (i’m not digging deep enough to put a solid date on that), but didn’t make the fbi/ins terrorist watch list until late august 2001. would a couple extra weeks have found them? would it have stopped them at the airport?
perhaps moving up the september 4 cabinet meeting on terrorism by a few weeks would make some difference…
anyway, pure speculation, of course…
pdb text below…
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